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When Death Strikes the Nation: The
Assassination of Prime Minister Rabin
and the Problem of Succession
ADAM M. DODEK*
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 4, 1995, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin
was assassinated after attending a pro-government rally in Tel
Aviv.1 His death marked the first assassination of an Israeli politi-
cal leader in Israel's short history. In addition to this tragedy, Is-
raelis struggled to digest the fact that a Jew had killed the Jewish
state's leader. Despite the national trauma, the immediate transfer
of power proceeded smoothly. Foreign Minister Shimon Peres be-
came Interim Prime Minister, and after the seven-day mourning
period, President Ezer Weizman selected Peres to form a new
government. 2 The opposition Likud Party did not oppose Peres,
and most of the smaller parties passively supported the President's
decision. 3 Likud leader Binyamin Netanyahu stated his party's
position, proclaiming that "in a democracy, governments are re-
* Associate, Bronson, Bronson & McKinnon, LLP. B.A., McGill, 1992; J.D., Har-
vard Law School, 1995. In 1995-1996, I was a Fulbright Scholar and Frederick S. Sheldon
Fellow researching Israeli constitutional law while clerking for Justice Itzhak Zamir of the
Supreme Court of Israel. I thank Professor Bruce Elman for his invaluable assistance and
guidance in reading numerous earlier drafts of this Article and discussing issues with me.
I also thank Eric S. Block, Arthur Dodek, Eric Fisher, Itzhak Zamir, and Allen Zysblat
for reading earlier drafts of this Article and providing helpful comments.
1. See Marjorie Miller, Israel's Rabin Assassinated, CHI. SUN TIMES, Nov. 5, 1995, at
1.
2. See Steve Wulf, Thou Shalt Not Kill (Assassination of Yitzak Rabin), TIME, Nov.
13, 1995, at 4.
3. See id. at 5.
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Thus, Peres quickly and easily formed the new government, making
few personnel changes. The new government appeared virtually the
same as its predecessor, except for Yitzhak Rabin's conspicuous ab-
sence.5
In retrospect, Israel was fortunate after the assassination. Despite
confusion and the absence of a contingency plan for handling the death
of a Prime Minister, 6 the government quickly assembled and appointed
the acknowledged "number two" man in the government, Shimon
Peres, as the official successor to slain Prime Minister Rabin. Peres'
status prevented political fighting within the Labor Party; thus, the
party unanimously selected him as its candidate to form the next gov-
ernment. 7 A unique combination of factors produced a straightfor-
ward succession: unprecedented international support, opposition ac-
quiescence, internal party unity, and the availability of a natural
successor. It is improbable that a similar combination of accommodat-
ing factors would accompany a future fatality in the Prime Minister's
office.
Israelis widely accepted Binyamin Netanyahu's declaration of the
Likud Party's position because it expressed their instinctive reaction to
the Prime Minister's assassination; however, the declaration neither
did nor does reflect the law. Under Israeli law, the government is
deemed to resign upon the Prime Minister's death and remains in of-
fice only in a caretaker capacity until a new government forms.8 Al-
though murder should not change governments, under Israel's consti-
this statement in Hebrew: "be'demokratia mahlifiim memshala be'bchirot lo be'retzach."
Gideon Allon, Halikud Yamlitz L'Nasi L'Hatil Et Harcavat Hamemshalah Al Muamad
Ha 'avodah [The Likud Will Recommend to the President That He Assign the Task of Forming a
Government to the Labor Candidate], HA'ARETS, Nov. 6, 1995, at A6.
5. See infra note 41.
6. See Reuven Shapira et al., Rosh Hamemshalah, Yitzchak Rabin, Nirtzach Biydai Mit-
nakash [The Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, Is Slain by an Assassin], HA'ARETS, Nov. 5,
1995, at Al (reporting that there was no plan for such a contingency and that Minister of Relig-
ious Affairs Shimon Shetreet, who contacted the Government Secretary while Rabin was still
in the operating room, was the first person to recommend assembling the government for a
special meeting).
7. See Wulf,supra note 2, at 5.
8. See Basic Law: The Government, § 23(b), 1968, 22 L.S.I. 257, 261 (1967-1968);
Basic Law: The Government, § 28, 1992, S.H. 214, translated in Israel Supplement,
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 9, 20 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H.
Flanz eds., Susan Hattis Rolef trans., Release 94-7, 1994). The 1992 Basic Law replaced the
1968 Basic Law upon elections to the Fourteenth Knesset in May 1996. See id. § 63, trans-
lated in Israel Supplement, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 9, 41 (Albert
P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., Susan Hattis Rolef trans., Release 94-7, 1994).
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tution, murder does change governments.
A vacancy in the premiership necessitates continuity and unity,
but the Israeli political system does just the opposite: it promotes un-
certainty and internal political fighting. When a Prime Minister dies in
office, Israel can ill afford a power vacuum. It is unacceptable to im-
provise in a time of great national need. Succession should be auto-
matic and immediate. The successor should assume the position of the
deceased Prime Minister and complete his term in office. The time for
mourning is not the time for politicking.
This Article describes Israel's constitutional response to the Prime
Minister's death. Parts II and III explain the operation of the Israeli
legal system after Prime Minister Rabin's assassination and the impact
of the new system of direct election of the Prime Minister. Part IV
compares and contrasts the approaches of Great Britain, Canada, Aus-
tralia, and the United States to the death of a head of government.
Part V then discusses succession in more general terms against the
background of both the old and new Israeli systems and other democ-
racies' systems. Finally, Part VI proposes reforms for the Israeli sys-
tem that may help to maintain fidelity to the notion that "governments
are replaced through elections, not by murder."
II. THE OLD BASIC LAW: THE GOVERNMENT (1968)
When Prime Minister Rabin was pronounced dead at 11:15 p.m.
on November 4, 1995, the government unofficially resigned. Under
the Basic Law: The Government (1968) (1968 Basic Law), the death
of the Prime Minister effects the resignation of the government. 9
Consequently, the government was effectively frozen in its current
composition. No ministers could resign, and none could be added to
the government. 10
The 1968 Basic Law made no provision for automatic succession
upon the Prime Minister's death. Although the law provided for both
a Vice Premier11 and up to two Deputy Prime Ministers, 12 neither of
these positions had a constitutional role in the event of the Prime Min-
ister's death. The President also had no role in the event of the Prime
9. See Basic Law: The Government, § 23(b), 1968, 22 L.S.I. 257, 261.
10. See AMNON RUBINSTEIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 538 (4th
ed. 1991) (source in Hebrew).
11. See Basic Law: The Government, § 19, 1968, 22 L.S.I. 257, 260.
12. See id. § 34, at 263.
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Minister's death. Thus, no one was automatically in charge of the
government upon Rabin's death. The government did not have a
leader until it appointed an Interim Prime Minister.
The Vice Premier is a patronage appointment rather than a func-
tionally significant office. The position was created during the nego-
tiations preceding the First National Unity Government of 1984.13,
The National Unity Agreement called for rotating premierships be-
tween the leaders of the Labor Party and the Likud Party.14 The par-
ties created the vice premiership for the party leader who was not oc-
cupying the premiership, in order to provide a position of honor and to
enhance the status of the party leader in the National Unity Govern-
ment. 15 Nevertheless, the Vice Premier does not automatically suc-
ceed the Prime Minister upon the Prime Minister's death. The 1968
Basic Law provides that the Vice Premier shall act in place of the
Prime Minister if the Prime Minister is "temporarily unable to carry
out his functions." 16 Although it would make political and logistical
sense for the Vice Premier to succeed the Prime Minister, section
25(b) of the Basic Law would still require the government's consent to
do so.
17
The office of Deputy Prime Minister is even more vague because
its functions are not defined. The 1968 Basic Law simply states that
the Prime Minister may appoint one or two ministers as Deputy Prime
Ministers. 18 Deputy Prime Minister is merely an additional title of
status bestowed upon a minister as a sign of political power. 19  A
13. See RUBINSTEIN, supra note 10, at 527.
14. See id.
15. See id. at 528 (discussing the creation of the office for "political needs").
16. Compare Basic Law: The Government, § 19, 1968, 22 L.S.I. 257, 260, with id. §
25(b), at 261, which explicitly provides, for the replacement of the Prime Minister upon the
Prime Minister's death.
17. Furthermore, in the context of the National Unity Government, which is based on a
power-sharing agreement between the Labor Party and the Likud Party, it is inconceivable that
either party would have permitted the other party's leader to succeed its leader. Until the La-
bour Party chose a new leader to replace the deceased Prime Minister, only a temporary suc-
cession would have been tolerated.
18. See Basic Law: The Government, § 34, 1968, 22 L.S.I. 257, 263.
19. In the negotiations preceding the establishment of Shimon Peres' government, the ap-
pointments of Moshe Shahal and Haim Ramon as Deputy Prime Ministers were discussed. In
such an event, however, the Meretz Party also would have demanded a Deputy Prime Minister
under the terms of the coalition agreement. See Yareach Tal, Composition of the Coalition
Will Not Change: Efforts to Complete External Support Agreements with the Ultra-Orthodox
Parties, HA'ARETS, Nov. 19, 1995, at All (source in Hebrew). The political necessity of ap-
pointing three Deputy Prime Ministers would have required an amendment to the 1968 Basic
(Vol. 19:57
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popular misconception about the Deputy Prime Minister's role is that a
nexus exists between the appellation and its function. 20 No such link
exists; the Deputy Premier has no legally functional role in the event
of the Prime Minister's death.
Moreover, the President has no role in the event of the Prime
Minister's death. The President is the head of state. 21  His role is
largely ceremonial, and he only has two powers that permit the exer-
cise of discretion: appointing a Member of the Knesset (MK) to form
a new government 22 and pardoning offenders.
23
The [P]resident is a creature of statute and his powers are defined
by law. Like everyone else in this country, he enjoys no rights or
privileges [that] are not accorded to him by the laws of the State
and every official act of his [that] exceeds the limits of the law is
null and void.
24
Israeli constitutional law does provide, however, for an Interim
Prime Minister. This position is filled only in the event of the Prime
Minister's death, 25 a situation that has Qccurred only once before in
Israel's history. 26 The government as a whole appoints an Interim
Law. Additionally, the appointments would have exposed the deputy premiership's stark po-
litical nature and utter functional uselessness.
20. See Wulf, supra note 2, at 5.
21. See Basic Law: The President of the State, § 1, 1964, 18 L.S.I. 111, 111 (1963-
1964).
22. See id. § 11(a)(2), at 112.
23. Seeid. § 11(b), at 112; see also RUBINSTEIN, supra note 10, at 654.
24. C.A. 185/59, Matana v. Attorney General, 14 P.D. 970, 976-77 (per Berinson, J.).
25. The Hebrew term for Interim Prime Minister is rosh ha'memshalah be 'poal, which
appears only in section 25(b) of the 1968 Basic Law. See Basic Law: The Government, §
25(b), 1968, 22 L.S.I. 257, 261 (1967-1968). This term must be distinguished from the He-
brew term for the person who acts in place of an absent Prime Minister, memaleh makom. Of-
ficially, this term is translated as "Acting Prime Minister." See id. § 19, at 260. Elsewhere it
is referred to as the "locum tenens of the Prime Minister." See Peter Elman, Legislation: Ba-
sic Law: The Government (1968), 4 IsR. L. REV. 242, 256 (1969). Unfortunately, in popular
usage, the term "Acting Prime Minister" is used for both rosh ha 'memshalah be'poal and me-
maleh makom. The English-language press referred to Shimon Peres as "Acting Prime Minis-
ter." See, e g., Raine Marcus et al., Rabin Assassinated: Pronounced Dead at 11:15 p.m Af-
ter Being Shot, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 5, 1995, at 1; Serge Schmemann, Assassination in
Israel: The Overview; Rabin Slain After Peace Rally in Tel Aviv, Israeli Gunman Held, Says
He Acted Alone, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1995, at Al. To avoid any confusion, this Article uses
the official translation of rosh ha 'memshalah be 'poal, "Interim Prime Minister," which better
captures the function of the position and distinguishes it from memaleh makom, a person who
acts for the Prime Minister in his temporary absence from the country.
26. When Prime Minister Levi Eshkol died in office in February 1969, the government
appointed Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon as Interim Prime Minister until Golda Meir es-
tablished a new government. See Yalkut HaPirsumun [Official Government Notices] [Y.H.]
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Prime Minister. 27 Thus, pursuant to Israeli constitutional law, the
government met shortly after the official announcement of Rabin's
death. Further, in the early hours of November 5, 1995, the govern-
ment officially appointed Peres as Interim-Prime Minister and Interim
Defense Minister. 28
For two decades, Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres were the two
leading figures in the Labor Party. They were intense rivals and the
main patrons in the Labor Party, dividing the party into factions and
forcing ministers and MKs into "the Rabin camp" or "the Peres
camp" of the party. Thus, when Yitzhak Rabin died, Shimon Peres
was Rabin's natural successor; no other member of the Labor Party
equaled Peres in status. Not surprisingly, no public debate ensued re-
garding the lack of Interim Prime Minister candidates other than Peres,
and the Labor Party immediately designated Peres to lead the party in
forming the new government. 29
Shimon Peres also met the formal qualifications for the position
of Interim Prime Minister. In particular, the law requires that the In-
terim Prime Minister be chosen from among the ministers who are
members of the Knesset. 30
As Interim Prime Minister, Peres had the duty to head a caretaker
No. 1509, at 967 (Feb. 26, 1969). The Deputy Prime Minister does not automatically act in
place of an absent or deceased Prime Minister. See supra pp. 60-61. In fact, a Deputy Prime
Minister is not always in office. For example, Rabin never appointed any Deputy Prime Min-
isters. See List of Ministers in Peres' Government (on file with author) (source in Hebrew);
Letter from Aryeh Zehar, Deputy Government Secretary of Israel, to Adam Dodek (Jan. 25,
1996) (on file with author) (source in Hebrew).
27. See Basic Law: The Government, § 25(b), 1968, 22 L.S.I. 257, 261.
28. See Y.H. No. 4344 (Nov. 5, 1995); Marcus et al.. supra note 25; Aluf Ben & Lili
Galili, Shimon Peres Munach L 'Rosh Hamemshalah B 'Pual [Shimon Peres Appointed Interim
Prime Minister], HA'ARETS, Nov. 5, 1995, at A2. In the period between Prime Minister
Rabin's shooting and the government's designation of Shimon Peres as the Interim Prime
Minister, there was no Acting Prime Minister. For this short time, -the country was essentially
without a Prime Minister.
29. See Wulf, supra note 2, at 5.
30. See Basic Law: The Government, § 25(b), 1968, 22 L.S.I. 257, 261. Under the Is-
raeli system, only the Prime Minister must be a member of the Knesset. See id. § 5(b), at 257.
In practice, however, the vast majority of ministers are Knesset members. Following Rabin's
death, this requirement for the Interim Prime Minister would have barred only two ministers
from consideration for the position: Interior Minister Ehud Barak and Minister of Agriculture
Ya'akov Tsur. Compare List of Ministers in Peres' Government, in Y.H. No. 4366, at 1052
(Dec. 28, 1995), with Names of People Elected as Members of the Thirteenth Knesset, in Y.H.
No. 4021, at 3776 (July 1, 1992).
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government3' until a new government was formed. Unlike the posi-
tion of Interim Prime Minister, the Israeli political system is familiar
with the concept of a caretaker government. A caretaker government
arises in several different situations: when a new Knesset has been
elected and a new government has not yet taken office; when the gov-
ernment resigns; when the Prime Minister resigns; when the Knesset
votes its non-confidence in the government; and when the Prime Min-
ister dies in office. 32 The 1968 Basic Law states that a caretaker gov-
ernment "shall continue to carry out its functions. "33
There has been much discussion about the extent of the caretaker
government's power and the basis for its legitimacy. 34 The frequency
and duration of caretaker governments have prompted these concerns.
In fact, caretaker governments have served Israel for ten percent of its
history. 35 Peres' caretaker government, however, survived for only
eighteen days. 36
Under the 1968 Basic Law, the President must consult with the
parties' representatives in the Knesset and assign the task of forming
the new government to one of the MKs. 3 7 After the seven-day
mourning period following Rabin's death, President Weizman began
consultations with all parties regarding the appointment of a party
leader in an attempt to form the new government. 38 The consultations
were largely a formality because it was generally acknowledged that
31. The Hebrew term for the government that "carries out its functions" until a new gov-
ernment takes office has numerous appellations. Literally translated, the term memshelet
ma 'avar means "transitional government." See THE COMPLETE HEBREW-ENGLISH Dic-
TIONARY 1366 (1990). It is also commonly referred to as a "caretaker government." See
Claude Klein, The Powers of the Caretaker Government: Are They Really Unlimited?, 12 ISR.
L. REV. 271, 272-73 (1977); see also Liat Collins, Likud and NRP Will Support Labor Care-
taker, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 6, 1995, at 2. This Article uses the term "caretaker govern-
ment," which seems to have a more restrictive connotation, than the present usage of
"transitional government," which has come to refer to long-term governments that are making
the transition to democracy, such as the current government in South Africa.
32. See Basic Law: The Government, § 25(a), 1968, 22 L.S.I. 257, 261; see also
RUBINSTEIN, supra note 10, at 536-39.
33. Basic Law: The Government, § 25(a), 1968, 22 L.S.I. 257, 261.
34. See infra pp. 77-78; Klein, supra note 31.
35. See ZEEV SEGAL, ISRAELI DEMOCRACY 137 (1991) (source in Hebrew).
36. The caretaker government came into being upon Prime Minister Rabin's death on No-
vember 4, 1995 and served until the Knesset swore in Shimon Peres' new government on No-
vember 22, 1995. See Y.H. No. 4366, at 1052 (Dec. 28, 1995) (announcing the new govern-
ment's constitution on November 22, 1995).
37. See Basic Law: The Government § 6, 1968, 22 L.S.I. 257, 257; Basic Law: The
President of the State, § I1(a)(2), 1964, 18 L.S.I. 111, 112 (1963-1964).
38. See Wulf, supra note 2, at 5.
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Shimon Peres would be given the task of forming the new government.
During the President's consultations with the parties over the course of
two days, most of the parties recommended that the President desig-
nate Peres to form the new government. 39 Accordingly, on November
15, 1995, President Weizman appointed Peres to attempt that task.
40
Peres accepted the President's appointment and established a new
government that strongly resembled its predecessor. 4 1 The Knesset
announced its confidence in the new government on November 22,
1995, well within the twenty-one day period accorded by law for the
establishment of a new government.42 Thus, on November 22, eight-
een days after Rabin's assassination, the succession became complete,
and Interim Prime Minister Peres became Prime Minister Peres.
III. THE NEW BASIC LAW: THE GOVERNMENT (1992)
The Knesset enacted a new Basic Law: The Government (1992)
(1992 Basic Law), which became operative upon elections to the
Fourteenth Knesset in May 1996.43 The 1992 Basic Law combines
features of both the presidential system and the existing parliamentary
system. 44 The central aspect of the 1992 Basic Law is direct election
39. See id.
40. See, e.g., Batsheva Tsur, Weizman Asks Peres to Form Government, JERUSALEM
POST, Nov. 16, 1995, at 1; Serge Schmemann, Israeli Police Hold Student as a Plotter
Against Rabin, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1995, at All.
41. All ministers from the Rabin government remained in their previous posts, except for
the following changes: Ehud Barak moved from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs; Haim Ramon rejoined the government as Minister of the Interior; Yossi Beilin
became a minister in the Prime Minister's Office; and Rabbi Yehuda Amital became a Minister
without Portfolio. Compare List of Ministers in Peres' Government, in Y.H. No. 4366, at
1052 (Dec. 28, 1995), with List of Ministers in Rabin's Government (on file with author)
(source in Hebrew). Although he was not listed as a minister, Director General of the Foreign
Ministry Uri Savir was assigned the additional role of Special Peace Envoy. Compare List of
Ministers in Peres' Government, in Y.H. No. 4366, at 1052 (Dec. 28, 1995), with List of
Ministers in Rabin's Government (on file with author) (source in Hebrew). Finally, Peres as-
sumed Rabin's vacant portfolios: the defense ministry and the premiership. Compare List of
Ministers in Peres' Government, in Y.H. No. 4366, at 1052 (Dec. 28, 1995), with List of
Ministers in Rabin's Government (on file with author) (source in Hebrew).
42. See Basic Law: The Government, § 7, 1968, 22 L.S.I. 257, 258. For a report of the
Knesset's approval of the Peres government, see Y.H. No. 4366, at 1052 (Dec. 28, 1995);
Liat Collins, Knesset Approves Peres Cabinet, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 23, 1995, at 1.
43. See Basic Law: The Government, § 63, 1992, S.H. 214, translated in Israel Supple-
ment, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 9, 41 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gis-
bert H. Flanz eds., Susan Hattis Rolef trans., Release 94-7, 1994).
44. The impetus for the reforms may be traced to hatargil hamasriach, literally the
"stinky trick" of 1990, which exposed the worst evils of the Israeli electoral and political sys-
tem. See GIDEON ALLON, DIRECT ELECTION 62-86 (1995) (source in Hebrew). In the subse-
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of the Prime Minister concurrent with general elections for the
Knesset. Proponents of the 1992 Basic Law hope that concurrent
elections will produce similar results for the premiership and the
Knesset.45 The reformers intended to produce a stronger Prime Minis-
ter at the center of a more stable government. To this end, a
no-confidence vote requires an absolute majority of Knesset members,
or sixty one MKs, and means the dissolution of the Knesset and the
fall of the current government. 46
Under the 1968 Basic Law, no-confidence motions brought down
the government but did not automatically dissolve the Knesset, though
they sometimes led to dissolution.47 Under the 1992 Basic Law, the
resignation, removal, permanent incapacitation, or death of the Prime
Minister leads to the resignation of the government as a whole. 48 To
replace the government, the 1992 Basic Law provides for "special
elections" of the Prime Minister within sixty days. 49 Thus, the 1992
Basic Law eliminates any role for the President in the selection of the
Prime Minister. It also deletes the positions of Vice Premier and
Deputy Prime Minister, though the continued existence of these posi-
tions is likely.
If the 1992 Basic Law had been operative when Prime Minister
Rabin was assassinated, Rabin's death would have triggered "special
elections" of the Prime Minister. 50  Until the newly-elected Prime
quent Knesset, MKs from four different parties submitted bills to reform the electoral system.
In a rare display of multi-partisan cooperation, the MKs worked together to produce a re-
formed political structure that is outlined in the 1992 Basic Law. For a history of the push for
direct election of the Prime Minister, see id.
45. See Bernard Susser, 'Parliadential' Politics: A Proposed Constitution for Israel, 42
PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 112, 118 (1989).
46. Compare Basic Law: The Government, § 19, 1992, S.H. 214, translated in Israel
Supplement, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 9, 16-17 (Albert P. Blaustein
& Gisbert H. Flanz eds., Susan Hattis Rolef trans., Release 94-7, 1994), with Basic Law: The
Government, § 24, 1968, 22 L.S.I. 257, 261. There were other proposals to require a special
majority to topple the government. See Susser, supra note 45, at 114-15.
47. See Basic Law: The Government, § 24, 1968, 22 L.S.I. 257, 261.
48. See Basic Law: The Government, §§ 23(c), 26(d), 27(e), 28, 1992, S.H. 214, trans-
lated in Israel Supplement, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 9, 18-20
(Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., Susan Hattis Rolef trans., Release 94-7, 1994).
49. See id. § 10, translated in Israel Supplement, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF
THE WORLD 9, 11 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., Susan Hattis Rolef trans.,
Release 94-7, 1994).
50. See id. § 28, translated in Israel Supplement, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF
THE WORLD 9, 20 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., Susan Hattis Rolef trans.,
Release 94-7, 1994). The 1992 Basic Law requires that this special election be held on the last
Tuesday before the end of 60 days after the precipitating event. See id. § 10(a), translated in
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Minister took office, the government would have appointed an Interim
Prime Minister to head a caretaker government, a procedure that also
existed under the 1968 Basic Law. 51 In addition, under the 1992 Basic
Law, if less than one year had remained before the next scheduled
Knesset elections, these elections would have been advanced, and the
"special election" of the Prime Minister would have become a general
election for both the Prime Minister and the Knesset. 52 Therefore, if
the 1992 Basic Law had applied at the time of Rabin's assassination,
election day would have been January 2, 1996, and Israelis would
have gone to the polls to elect both a new Prime Minister and a new
Knesset.
IV. THE EXPERIENCE OF OTHER DEMOCRACIES
Because Israel's government is patterned after the Westminster
parliamentary system, 53 it is pertinent to examine the workings of the
British system. As Israel struggles to reform its adaptation of the par-
liamentary system, it is also useful to discuss the Canadian and Aus-
tralian government systems, which are variations of the British parlia-
mentary system. An examination of the U.S. presidential system is
also relevant as Israeli reformers look to it as an alternate model.
54
Different categories or types of succession may be identified in
both the parliamentary and presidential systems. First, succession may
Israel Supplement, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 9, 11 (Albert P.
Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., Susan Hattis Rolef trans., Release 94-7, 1994).
51. Section 29 provides that the government appoints an Interim Prime Minister until a
new Prime Minister takes office. See id. § 29, translated in Israel Supplement, CONSTI-
TUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 9, 20-21 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz
eds., Susan Hattis Rolef trans., Release 94-7, 1994). Section 31 provides that ministers con-
tinue in office until a new Prime Minister takes office. See id. § 31, translated in Israel Sup-
plement, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 9, 21-22 (Albert P. Blaustein &
Gisbert H. Flanz eds., Susan Hattis Rolef trans., Release 94-7, 1994). Section 32 provides
that the previous government continues in office until a new government takes office. See id.
§ 32, translated in Israel Supplement, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 9,
22 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., Susan Hattis Rolef trans., Release 94-7,
1994).
52. See id. § 10(b), translated in Israel Supplement, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES
OF THE WORLD 9, 11 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., Susan Hattis Rolef trans.,
Release 94-7, 1994).
53. For a comparison of the British and Israeli governmental systems, see CONSTI-
TUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 8; STANLEY DE SMITH & RODNEY
BRAZIER, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 175 (7th ed. 1994). See also
RODNEY BRAZIER, CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 6-24 (2d ed. 1994).
54. See generally Susser, supra note 45.
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be either automatic or delayed. Automatic succession is pre-
determined, by operation of law, before the leader's death. Delayed
succession requires a decision-making procedure prior to the succes-
sor's emergence or appointment. Second, succession may be either
temporary or permanent. A temporary successor is a limited succes-
sor who assumes a caretaker role until the ascension of the permanent
successor. A permanent successor assumes the position of the de-
ceased leader and completes the existing mandate.
In utilizing a comparative analysis, this Article examines several
issues. First, this Article looks at the status of a government after the
death of its head of government. Second, this Article analyzes a
country's procedure for succession of its head of government. If a
country's constitution provides for automatic succession, this Article
discusses the nature of this procedure, in particular, whether the suc-
cession is temporary or permanent. If a country's constitution does
not provide for automatic succession, however, this Article analyzes
the procedure for selecting a new head of government. It examines the
constitutional powers and role of the head of state. In examining a
country's procedure for succession, this Article also looks at the status
and function of a deputy who is appointed to lead the government.
A. Great Britain
No British Prime Minister has died in office in this century.
Nevertheless, this contingency is a source of speculation, uncertainty,
and disagreement among British constitutional 55 experts. At the center
of this uncertainty is the role of the sovereign.
In Great Britain, the Queen is the head of state. 56 It is her consti-
tutional duty to appoint the Prime Minister. 57 Over time, however, the
process of democratization has whittled away most of the Queen's dis-
cretion. Ordinarily, her choice is restricted to the leader of the party
55. A.V. Dicey described English constitutional law as "appearing to include all rules
which directly or indirectly affect the distribution or the exercise of the Sovereign power in the
State." A.V. DICEY, LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 23 (9th ed. 1956). As succession goes to
the heart of "the exercise of the Sovereign power in the State," this definition of constitutional
law provides a helpful framework for our analysis.
56. See GRAEME C. MOODIE, THE GOVERNMENT OF GREAT BRITAIN 14 (2d ed. 1964).
57. See id. at 74-75. In other parliamentary democracies, either a Governor General,
such as in Australia and Canada, or a President, such as in Israel's old system, plays this role.
See id. at 75.
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that commands a majority in the House of Commons. 58 When a Prime
Minister intends to resign, the departing leader usually remains in of-
fice until the party chooses a successor. 59 Once the choice is made,
the Prime Minister officially resigns, and the Queen appoints the new
leader as Prime Minister. 60 Thus, in the British parliamentary system,
a vacancy in the premiership through death, resignation, or removal
does not alter the government's status. As long as the government
continues to command a majority in the legislature, it remains in
power. 61
The Queen's royal prerogative to designate the Prime Minister
prohibits automatic succession. The sovereign always acts as an in-
termediary between Prime Ministers. Although this prerogative pro-
hibits automatic succession de jure, de facto succession nonetheless
may exist. For example, the Prime Minister may resign upon the se-
lection of a replacement in the party or after a general election. 62 In
this situation, the sovereign exercises no discretion in choosing the
new Prime Minister because the replacement is automatic.
Additionally, executive power does not devolve to the Queen
upon the Prime Minister's death; the soveriegn's power is restricted.
Over a century ago, Sir Walter Bagehot stated that the Queen has no
executive or sovereign power.63 By appointing the Prime Minister,
the sovereign ensures that there is an executive, but does not exercise
executive power under the British constitution.64
The office of Deputy Prime Minister is a relatively new part of
the British constitution. Unlike Israeli practice, the deputy premier-
ship in Britain has been used to set out the Prime Minister's preferred
line of succession to the premiership. There are at least three different
reasons for having a Deputy Prime Minister: to mark a successor,65
to promote efficient discharge of government business, and to recog-
58. See id.
59. See VERNON BOGDANOR, THE MONARCHY AND THE CONSTITUTION 85 (1995).
60. See id. at 86.
61. See DE SMITH & BRAZIER, supra note 53, at 175; see also BRAZIER, supra note 53,
at 6-24.
62. See BRAZIER, supra note 53, at 72-73.
63. See WALTER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 98-99 (1963).
64. See id. at 99; see also DICEY, supra note 55, at 462 (quoting Thiers's maxim that "the
King reigns but does not govern").
65. Given the parties' formal procedures for electing a leader, however, this reason is
now considered illegitimate. See BRAZIER, supra note 53, at 74.
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nize the status of the party's deputy leader. 66 Administrative concerns
raised by the second reason are most pressing in the event of the Prime
Minister's death. In that situation, the Deputy Prime Minister may en-
sure government continuity by taking temporary but immediate charge
of affairs. 67 The current Prime Minister, John Major, has stated,
however, that there'are no standing arrangements for such a contin-
gency. 68
Although a Deputy Prime Minister may play an important role in
ensuring continuity in the event of the Prime Minister's death, there is
no certainty that the Deputy Prime Minister will emerge as the perma-
nent successor. History demonstrates that most attempts to use the
deputy premiership to secure succession have been unsuccessful. Of
all the Deputy Prime Ministers since 1940, only one has become Prime
Minister. 69 Moreover, a trend against the Deputy Prime Minister de-
veloped under the reign of former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
and continued under current Prime Minister Major. Major's decision
to appoint a Deputy Prime Minister in 1995 broke this trend.
70
The potential "successor" role of the Deputy Prime Minister has
also generated much controversy about the office itself. In fact, some
people perceive the designation of a Deputy Prime Minister as an in-
fringement on the royal prerogative to choose the Prime Minister, and
thus, view the office as unconstitutional. 71 Prior to 1965, the designa-
tion of a Deputy Prime Minister might have been viewed as an attempt
to establish beyond a doubt the eventual succession to the premier-
ship. 72 Because of the governing party's power to choose a successor
and to indicate this choice to the sovereign, 73 however, the office of
Deputy Prime Minister may no longer be viewed as unconstitutional.
66. See Rodney Brazier, The Deputy Prime Minister, 1988 PUB. L. 176.
67. See id. at 179.
68. See BRAZIER, supra note 53, at 76 (citing 221 H.C. Deb. 709-10 (written answer
Mar. 1993)).
69. See Brazier, supra note 66, at 178. Only Anthony Eden succeeded to the premiership
from the deputy premiership. See id.
70. See id. at 181 (discussing Margaret Thatcher's decision not to appoint a Deputy Prime
Minister); BRAZIER, supra note 53, at 76 (discussing John Major's similar decision). In the
cabinet shuffle of 1995, however, Major appointed Michael Hesseltine as the first Secretary of
State and the Deputy Prime Minister. See Cabinet List (on file with author).
71. See BRAZIER, supra note 53, at 74.
72. See Brazier, supra note 66, at 176.
73. See id. at 178.
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Because no British Prime Minister has died in this century, 74 the
specific mechanics of the procedure for replacing a deceased Prime
Minister are a source of speculation. Some commentators believe that
the sovereign retains discretion in the event of the Prime Minister's
death. 75 Others assert that the sovereign has no discretion even to se-
lect a caretaker Prime Minister while the party chooses a new leader.
76
Although Great Britain presently has no contingency plans for
dealing with a Prime Minister's death, 77 such plans have existed. For
example, during Prime Minister Harold Wilson's illness in the 1960s,
the Labour Party planned for succession. 78 Labour Ministers of Par-
liament (MPs) would have convened within forty-eight hours of Wil-
son's death to elect a new leader, and the Queen, who apparently had
approved the plan, would have appointed the new Prime Minister.
79
Other contingency plans are also possible: the Queen may select
a caretaker Prime Minister while the party selects a new leader; the
government may designate an Interim Prime Minister, similar to the
practice in Israel; or the Deputy Prime Minister or a senior minister
may automatically assume a caretaker role until the party selects a new
leader. 80
In conclusion, uncertainty continues to plague the British practice
of succession due to the uncertain scope of the Queen's discretion, the
ambiguous role of the Deputy Prime Minister, and the lack of a de-
finitive contingency plan.
74. The government has not even planned for the contingency of the Prime Minister's
death in office. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
75. See IVOR JENNINGS, THE QUEEN'S GOVERNMENT 42 (1964). This belief certainly
appeared to be true before the Conservative Party elected their leader. See IVOR JENNINGS,
THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION 114 (5th ed. 1966); see also SYDNEY D. BAILEY, BRITISH
PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY 17 (3d ed. 1971). Currently, both the Conservative Party and
the Labour Party elect their leaders.
76. See ANTHONY H. BIRCH, THE BRITISH SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 69 (rev. ed. 1973)
(stating that the monarch must wait until the governing party elects a new leader and then in-
vite the new leader to become the Prime Minister); BRAZIER, supra note 53, at 12 (stating that
the Deputy Prime Minister or a senior minister leads the government while the party selects a
new leader, who is then appointed Prime Minister).
77. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
78. See BRAZIER, supra note 53, at 12-13 n.23 (citing TONY BENN, OUT OF THE
WILDERNESS: DIARIES 1963-1967, at 263 (1987)).
79. See id.
80. See id. at 12. Brazier places interesting restrictions on the actions of the caretaker
government. He states that the caretaker leader is not appointed Prime Minister, but rather
merely oversees the government, deciding only urgent matters and only with the Cabinet's
consent. See id.
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B. Canada
Canadian constitutional practice in the area of succession reflects
its British origin. Although the Queen of England is Canada's official
constitutional head, the Governor General, who is the Queen's repre-
sentative in Canada, is effectively the formal head of state. 81 As in
Great Britain, when a Canadian Prime Minister dies, there is no
change of government, only a leadership vacuum. 82 Upon the Prime
Minister's death, the Governor General selects a new Prime Minister,
but numerous conventions restrict the Governor General's choice.
83
Normally, the Governor General chooses the leader of the party that
commands a majority in the House of Commons. 84 When the Prime
Minister dies, there is a majority but no leader. All the parties, how-
ever, have procedures to quickly choose an acting leader. 85 The act-
ing leader is either confirmed or replaced at a convention. Under the
Canadian procedure, months may pass before a successor becomes
Prime Minister.
Similar to their British counterparts, Canadian commentators are
divided on whether the Governor General maintains personal discre-
tion to appoint a caretaker Prime Minister upon the Prime Minister's
death. 86 The Governor General has had to appoint a new Prime Minis-
ter only once in Canada's history: upon the death of Prime Minister
81. See PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 3-9 (3d ed. 1992).
82. See id. at 9-22 ("The country does not lack a government, but merely a Prime Minis-
ter.").
83. See id.; J.R. MALLORY, THE STRUCTURE OF CANADIAN GOVERNMENT 78 (rev. ed.
1984).
84. See MALLORY, supra note 83, at 78.
85. See LIBERAL PARTY OF CAN. CONST. art. 17(3) (amended 1994); NEW CONST. OF
THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE PARTY OF CAN. art. 11.5; CONST. OF THE REFORM PARTY
OF CAN. an. 6(e) (amended 1994); CONST. OF THE NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY art. 7, § 6
(amended 1995).
86. See ANDREW HEARD, CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS 21, 25 (1991).
J.R. Mallory, an expert on Canadian government, has stated that, in the event of the Prime
Minister's death, the next senior minister automatically becomes the Prime Minister and leads
a caretaker government until the party chooses a replacement leader, who becomes the perma-
nent Prime Minister. See MALLORY, supra note 83, at 51. Mallory strongly criticizes this
process because it delays the selection of a new leader for several months. See id. Mallory
emphasizes that continuity of government is essential and that there is little time for any proc-
ess to find a party leader. See id. at 78. Thus, Mallory favors a system where the Governor
General selects a member of Parliament to form a new government, calling it a "necessary and
useful device for ensuring the succession to government." See id. at 51. Canada's history
evidences the problem with this system: when Prime Minister John A. MacDonald died in
1891, the Governor General negotiated for ten days before he could find a successor. See id.
at 78-79.
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John A. MacDonald in 1896.87
Canadian constitutional practice includes the appointment of an
Acting Prime Minister; which is similar to the Israeli Vice Premier or
locum tenens.88 The Acting Prime Minister fills in during the Prime
Minister's absence and may only act in accordance with the circum-
stances mentioned in the appointment. 89 Although some experts assert
that the death or resignation of the Prime Minister terminates the ap-
pointment of the Acting Prime Minister, 90 the Privy Council Office
has other interpretations. The Privy Council Office, which oversees
the government machinery and ensures government continuity, has a
contingency plan that automatically replaces the Prime Minister with
the Acting Prime Minister when the Prime Minister can no longer
serve in office. 9 1 The Acting Prime Minister assumes a caretaker role
until the Governor General appoints the new Prime Minister. 92
The office of Deputy Prime Minister is a recent development in
Canadian government. 93 Some consider the individual holding this
position as the second-in-command of the government; 94 however, this
notion is uncertain. On the one hand, Canadian parties do not choose
87. See HOGG, supra note 81, at 9-23.
88. It is standard practice for a new government to enact a minute of council in the early
days of the administration, designating a minister or senior minister to act in the Prime Minis-
ter's absence from the capital. See MALLORY, supra note 83, at 98.
89. See id. at 98-99.
90. See id. at 99.
91. An Order-in-Council sets out a roster of ministers "to act for the Prime Minister in his
absence or in the event of his being unable to perform the functions of his office." P.C.
1996-126 sched. A (1996).
92. Letter from Nicole Jauvin, Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet (Machinery of Govern-
ment), Privy Council Office, Government of Canada, to Adam M. D6dek 2 (Feb. 7, 1996) (on
file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal) (stating that,
in practice, the Governor General seeks informal advice from senior members of the govern-
ment party, notably the Acting Prime Minister and the acting leader of the party, regarding the
person to invite to form a government party).
93. Over ten years ago, Professor Mallory wrote that the office of the Deputy Prime Min-
ister had "not on the whole extended to Canadian practice." MALLORY, supra note 83, at 98.
In 1977, Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau appointed the first Deputy Prime Minister. See
Letter from Nicole Jauvin, supra note 92, at 3. Since then, all Canadian Prime Ministers have
appointed Deputy Prime Ministers. See id. In the future, the increasing importance of the
Deputy Prime Minister as the first choice to replace the Prime Minister may cause the Gover-
nor General to look to the Deputy Prime Minister as the first choice for an Interim Prime Min-
ister. See HEARD, supra note 86, at 25.
94. See MALLORY, supra note 83, at 98. Hogg does not even consider the office of
Deputy Prime Minister important enough to mention in his comprehensive treatise on Canadian
constitutional law. See HOGG, supra note 81.
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deputy leaders. 95 Thus, unlike Great Britain, the Deputy Prime Minis-
ter in Canada is not the deputy leader of the party. On the other hand,
the Deputy Prime Minister is not necessarily the second person in or-
der of precedence on the cabinet list. 96 Thus, the position does not
necessarily reflect a "number two" status in the party or in the gov-
ernment. Ironically, one of the responsibilities of the Deputy Prime
Minister is to act in the Prime Minister's absence.
97
C. Australia
Unlike Canada and Britain, Australia has a contingency plan for
succession following the Prime Minister's death, which has arisen sev-
eral times in this century. In Australia, the Deputy Prime Minister be-
comes the Prime Minister in a caretaker role upon the Prime Minis-
ter's death while the party selects a new leader. 98 When the new
leader is chosen, the caretaker Prime Minister resigns, and the Gover-
nor General appoints the new leader as the Prime Minister. 99
Although this non-statutory proces' has been implemented three
times in this century, it is unclear whether a "convention" or even a
reliable precedent has been established.100 A Labour Party majority
government and a coalition government would follow different proce-
dures for succession. In a Labour government, the elected deputy
leader is the Deputy Prime Minister and becomes the Interim Prime
Minister upon the Prime Minister's death. 101 The Interim Prime Min-
ister must resign if the party caucus does not elect the Interim Prime
Minister as the new leader, and the Governor General appoints the
new leader as the Prime Minister. 102 This situation occurred when
Prime Minister John Curtin died in 1945 and Deputy Premier Francis
95. See Letter from Nicole Jauvin, supra note 92, at 2.
96. In the first cabinet of Prime Minister Jean Chretien from 1993 to January 1996, Dep-
uty Prime Minister Sheila Copps, who was also the Minister of the Environment, was twelfth
in order of precedence in the cabinet list. See Derek Ferguson, Top Liberals Leaving Cabinet
in Big Shuttle-Copps Winner as 3 Liberals Leaving Cabinet, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 14, 1996, at
4. In the cabinet shuffle of January 1996, Copps retained the deputy premiership and was
tenth in order of precedence on the cabinet list. See id.; Douglas Fisher, Press Gallery Plays
the Ratings Game, TORONTO SUN, July 9, 1995, at C3.
97. See Letter from Nicole Jauvin, supra note 92, at 2 (stating that the Deputy Prime
Minister is first on the list of ministers to act for the Prime Minister in his absence).
98. See GEORGE WINTERTON, MONARCHY TO REPUBLIC 38-39 (1994).
99. See THE LAWS OF AUSTRALIA 25 (John A. Riordan ed., 1994).
100. See WINTERTON, supra note 98, at 38.
101. See id. at 37-38.
102. See id. at 38.
1996l
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
Forde was appointed Interim Prime Minister. When the Labour Party
caucus elected Joseph Chifley as their new leader, Forde resigned, and
Chifley became Prime Minister. 10
3
By contrast, in a coalition government, the leader of the junior
partner in the coalition is the Deputy Prime Minister. 10 4 On both oc-
casions where the Prime Minister of a coalition government died in
office-J.A. Lyons in 1939 and Harold Holt in 1967-the Deputy
Prime Minister became the Interim Prime Minister, pending election of
a new leader of the senior coalition partner.' 0 5 Critics argue, how-
ever, that the deputy leader of the senior coalition partner should be
made Interim Prime Minister because he is the true heir apparent to the
deceased Prime Minister. 1
06
D. United States
The United States provides a rich source of comparison in the
institutional structure, theory, and experience of presidential succes-
sion. The original U.S. Constitution, as well as subsequent amend-
ments, squarely address the issue of succession. In total, eight U.S.
Presidents have died in office, four of whom have died in this cen-
tury. 10 7 The U.S. succession procedure presents a sharp contrast to
the parlimentary succession procedure. Under the U.S. presidential
system, the executive is separate from the legislature and does not owe
its position or continuation to the legislature's confidence. Rather, the
executive's legitimacy derives from the electorate's direct election of
the President. The status of the government does not change upon the
President's death.
The U.S. Constitution provides for automatic succession upon the
President's death. The Vice President succeeds the President auto-
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 40.
107. In the nineteenth century, the following Presidents died in office: William H. Harri-
son (1841), Zachary Taylor (1850), Abraham Lincoln (1865), and James A. Garfield (1881).
See, e.g., JOSEPH NATHAN KANE, FACTS ABOUT THE PRESIDENTS (1959). In the twentieth
century, the following Presidents died in office: William McKinley (1901), Warren G.
Harding (1923), Franklin D. Roosevelt (1945), and John F. Kennedy (1963). See, e.g., id.; 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 647 (Leonard W. Levy& Louis Fisher eds.,
1994). Of these eight Presidents, four were assassinated: Lincoln, Garfield, McKinley, and
Kennedy. See id. at 645-47. In addition, one President resigned: Nixon (1974). See id. at
1087.
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matically and immediately upon the death, resignation, or removal of
the President. 10 8 Indeed, the Vice President's primary function ap-
pears to be waiting for a presidential vacancy. The only other consti-
tutional function of the Vice President is serving as the President of the
Senate, which is a largely ceremonial post. 109
In the United States, government stability and continuity underlie
the issue of presidential succession. These concerns were reflected in
the development of the office of the Vice President, which calls for
automatic succession.1 10 Later amendments and experience also dealt
with these concerns. The Twentieth Amendment provides for the suc-
cession of the Vice President-elect if the President-elect dies before in-
auguration. 1 1 Furthermore, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment explicitly
provides for the automatic succession of the Vice President upon the
President's death, removal, or resignation," l2 thereby officially ruling
out the possibility of a special presidential election. 113  If the vice
presidency is also vacant, the U.S. system provides for a hierarchical
list of officers to succeed to the presidency.114
108. See U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, §1.
109. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4 (stating that, as the President of the Senate, the Vice
President does not vote unless there is a tie).
110. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1.
111. See U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3.
112. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1.
1 i3. See ALLAN P. SINDLER, UNCHOSEN PRESIDENTS 17 (1976) (explaining that Article II
of the Constitution originally required that the President "be elected," thus creating the pos-
sibility that a special presidential election might be required in the event of a vacancy).
114. See 3 U.S.C. § 19 (1994), which provides:
(a)(1) If, by reason of death, resignation, removal from office,
inability, or failure to qualify, there is neither a President nor Vice President to dis-
charge the powers and duties of the office of President, then the Speaker of the
House of Representatives shall, upon his resignation as Speaker and as Representa-
tive in Congress, act as president.
(b) If, at the time when under subsection (a) of this section a Speaker is to begin the
discharge of the powers and duties of the office of President, there is no Speaker, or
the Speaker fails to qualify as Acting President, then the President pro tempore of
the Senate shall, upon his resignation as President pro tempore and as Senator. act as
President.
(d)(l) If, by reason of death, resignation, removal from office, inability, or failure to
qualify, there is no President pro tempore to act as President under subsection (b) of
this section, then the officer of the United States who is the highest on the following
list, and who is not under disability to discharge the powers and duties of the office
of President shall act as President: Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Sec-
retary of Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Agricul-
ture, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor, Secretary of Health and Human
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Democratic legitimacy is not an overriding concern in U.S. presi-
dential succession. As the designated successor of the President, the
Vice President is elected with the President on the same ticket. Thus,
the potential presidential successor seemingly has the electorate's
stamp of approval. The "election" of the Vice President is more illu-
sory than real, however, because it occurs as a by-product of the elec-
tion of the President. 115 Thus, a successor President may have been
officially elected, but in practice, the electorate casts its votes for
presidential candidates, not vice presidential ones.
Additionally, an unelected Vice President may succeed the Presi-
dent. Gerald Ford was only a mid-term replacement for Spiro Agnew,
Richard Nixon's previous Vice President, who was forced to resign.
116
Nevertheless, Ford became President after Nixon resigned and ap-
pointed him and Congress confirmed him under the procedure speci-
fied in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 117 Furthermore, the line of suc-
cession in the case of a simultaneous vacancy of the presidency and the
vice presidency runs through the Congress, whose members are not
nationally elected, and through the cabinet, whose members are ap-
pointed, not elected. 118 The necessity of ensuring government stability
and continuity thus overrides concerns about the democratic legitimacy
of the successor.
Although literally only a heartbeat away from the President, the
Vice President does not have to fulfill presidential qualifications. For
example, President George Bush's Vice President, Dan Quayle, was
seen as a lightweight in U.S. politics. 119 Presidential candidates are
usually not concerned with the succession qualifications of their run-
ning mates. More commonly, the President selects a Vice President
Services, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Secretary of Transporta-
tion, Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Education, Secretary of Veteran Affairs.
115. See SINDLER, supra note 113, at 115-16.
116. See 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, supra note 107, at 922.
117. Seeid. at 930.
118. See3 U.S.C. § 19.
119. In this century, however, the vice presidency has been used as a stepping stone to the
presidency. Richard Nixon was Dwight Eisenhower's Vice President from 1952 to 1960 be-
fore being elected President in 1968. See JULES WITCOVER, CRAPSHOOT: ROLLING THE DICE
ON THE VICE PRESIDENCY 9 (1992). George Bush was Ronald Reagan's Vice President from
1980 to 1988 before serving as President from 1988 to 1992. See id. Lyndon Johnson's Vice
President, Hubert Humphrey, was an unsuccessful presidential candidate in 1968. See id.
Jimmy Carter's Vice President, Walter Mondale, was an unsuccessful presidential candidate in
1984. See id. For a general critique of the vice presidency and an argument for its abolition,
see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., On the Presidential Succession, 89 POL. SCI. Q. 475 (1974).
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"to balance the ticket," that is, to appeal to a constituency or a region
where he has a perceived weakness and hopes to attract votes.1 20 In
other cases, the vice presidency may be used to neutralize a political
rival as the office has no independent power and relies wholly on
presidential largesse. 121 Continuity, not quality, is the emphasis in
U.S. presidential succession.
E. Comparative Lessons
In Israel, the government dies with the Prime Minister. This is
not true in other parliamentary democracies or in the U.S. presidential
system. In the parliamentary systems of Great Britain, Canada, and
Australia, the process of succession is uncertain due to several factors:
the cloudy role of the head of state (all countries), 122 the lack of an
explicit contingency plan (Great Britain and Canada), and the fact that
the issue has not arisen in recent history (Great Britain and Canada).
In the U.S. presidential system, there is no issue of succession: it is
automatic and permanent.
Israel can ill afford the uncertainty in succession that exists in
other parliamentary democracies. Israel's crisis politics demand lead-
ership. A vacuum at the higher echelon of power may cause panic
among the populace in a time of crisis. Therefore, the U.S. model of
automatic succession is preferable to others: Great Britian has an un-
certain process, Australia merely has a plan, and most new democra-
cies have only taken steps to ensure that a power vacuum does not ex-
ist upon the death of the head of government. 123 Automatic succession
120. See SINDLER, supra note 113, at 38-39.
121. See id.
122. Uncertainty regarding the role of the head of state is not inherent in the parliamentary
system. In Israel, statutes explicitly delineate the powers of the head of state.
123. Ukraine, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic all provide for automatic but tem-
porary succession of the President until a new President is sworn into office. See UKR.
CONST. ch. 12, art. 114-10 (amended 1995), translated in Ukraine, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 57, 104 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed. & Council of Advisors to the Par-
liament of Ukraine trans., Release 96-3, 1996) (providing that the Chairman of the Supreme
Rada succeeds the President upon the President's death); DZIENNIK USTAW (Constitutional
Act, 1992) art. 49(2) (Pol.), translated in Poland Supplement, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 1, 24 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., Release 93-6,
1993) (providing that, if the presidency is vacant, the Marshall of the Sejm acts as President,
and if he is not able, the Marshall of the Senate); HUNG. CONST. (Act XX, 1949) art. 29/E(1)
(amended 1990), translated in Hungary, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD
1, 7 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed. & Sndor Gallai trans., Release 95-4, 1995) (providing that the
Speaker of the Parliament assumes the presidency in the event of the President's temporary
incapacity); CZECH REP. CONST. art. 66, translated in The Czech Republic, CONSTITUTIONS
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is the norm in Europe 124 and in other democracies. 125 New countries
seem to realize that they cannot afford to create the uncertainty in suc-
cession that exists in Great Britain and its former colonies. Automatic
succession is the trend.
V. THE PROBLEM OF SUCCESSION
The transition in Israel to the new system of direct election of the
Prime Minister does not permit Israel to simply abandon its previous
system. Because the new system merely grafts new features onto the
previous system, Israel must continue to draw lessons from the old
system. Furthermore, the continuation of the new system is far from
certain. Given the ease of change in the Basic Laws 126 and citizen
OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 117, 135 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds.,
Gisbert H. Flanz trans., Release 93-4, 1993) (providing that the Prime Minister executes the
functions of the President if the presidency is vacant). Similarly, the new May 1996 constitu-
tion of post-apartheid South Africa provides for succession by the Deputy President. See S.
AFR. CONST. ch. 5, § 90, reprinted in South Africa Supplement, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 1. 66 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., Release 96-4, 1996).
124. The constitutions of Portugal and France provide for automatic but temporary succes-
sion until a new President is selected. See CONSTITUIAO DA REPt)BLICA PORTUGUESA
[Constitution] ch. I, art. 135, translated in Portugal, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF
THE WORLD 19, 83 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., C~ndido Cunha, Directorate
General for Mass Communication trans., 1991) (providing that the President of the Assembly
acts as President if the presidency is vacant); FR. CONST. art. 7, translated in France,
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 22, 24 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H.
Flanz eds., 1988) (providing that the President of the Senate temporarily exercises the presi-
dential powers, or if he is unable, the government). In Ireland, a commission-composed of
the chair of the upper house, the chair of the lower house, and the Chief Justice-assumes the
powers of the presidency upon the President's death. See BUNDREACHT NA HEIREANN
[Constitution] art. 14, §§ 1-2 (Ir.) (amended 1990), reprinted in Ireland, CONSTITUTIONS OF
THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 1, 32-33 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., Re-
lease 94-2, 1994). The Deputy Prime Minister assumes the powers of the Prime Minister until
the President appoints a new Prime Minister. See id. art. 28, § 6(2), reprinted in Ireland,
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 1, 94 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H.
Flanz eds., 1994).
125. In India, the Vice President automatically but temporarily succeeds the President until
a new President is elected. See INDIA CONST. art. 65(1), reprinted in India, CONSTITUTIONS
OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 1, 86 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., Re-
lease 94-7, 1994); see also 2 H.M. SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA 2023 (4th ed.
1993). Even the Palestinian Authority has provided for automatic succession in case of a va-
cancy in the presidency. See Jon Immanuel, Palestinian Elections Do Not Guarantee Democ-
racy, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 19, 1996, at 7 (reporting that the head of the Legislative Council
is the legally designated successor to the President of the Palestinian Authority).
126. Basic Laws may be amended by a simple majority vote, unless a specific section has
an "entrenched clause" requiring a special majority to alter that section. See generally
RUBINSTEIN, supra note 10, at 455-59; Amnon Rubinstein, Israel's Piecemeal Constitution, in
26 STUDIES IN ISRAEL LEGISLATIVE PROBLEMS 201 (G. Tedeschi & U. Yadin, Institute for
Legislative Research & Comparative Law ed., 1966).
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calls to delay implementation of the 1992 Basic Law, 127 Israel must
continue to examine critically both systems.
Upon the Prime Minister's death, the caretaker government and
Interim Prime Minister lie at the center of both systems. A caretaker
government is charged with carrying on the duties of the government.
This transfer of duties arises in five contexts: the resignation, perma-
nent incapacitation, removal, and death of the-Prime Minister, as well
as a no-confidence motion in the Prime Minister.128 There has been
much discussion about the scope of a caretaker government's powers
and its relationship to the Knesset. 129 The applicability of a caretaker
government, however, in the event of the Prime Minister's death has
not been thoroughly analyzed.
Commentators have said that "[1]egally, there is no difference
between a government which 'carries on' after resignation, or after
having been defeated or even after the Premier's death."'1 30 The dif-
ference between a caretaker government and a regular government,
however, is the source of the caretaker government's power. A regu-
lar government derives its power from the Knesset's confidence. 131 In
contrast, a caretaker government derives its authority from the law,
not from the Knesset, 132 because it no longer serves with the Knesset's
confidence, unless it arises upon a Prime Minster's death. This prob-
lem of democratic legitimacy attracts scholars to examine the legiti-
macy of the caretaker government's actions.
Both a successful no-confidence motion and a government's res-
127. See, e.g., Gideon Allon, 77 Chevrai Knesset Tomchim B'Dchiyat Yisumo Shel
Hachoke L 'Bchirah Y'shira Shel Rosh Hamemshalah [77 MKs Support Delaying Implementa-
tion of the Law for Direct Election of the Prime Minister], HA'ARETS, Jan. 21, 1996, at A8;
Hachevrai Knesset Chazan, Bibi V'Gafni Yozmim Hotza 'at Chok L 'Dchiyat HaBchirah Hay-
ishirah Shel Rosh Hamemshalah [MKs Chazan, Bibi and Gafni Initiate Bill to Delay Direct
Election of the PM], HA'ARETS, Jan. 25, 1996, at A5. Despite these calls for delay, Israel
conducted the May 1996 elections in accordance with the 1992 Basic Law, which called for
direct election of the Prime Minister. See Serge Schmemann, As Israelis Prepare to Vote, The
World Watches Closely, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1996, at A10.
128. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
129. See Klein, supra note 31; see also ELIAHU S. LIKHovsKI, ISRAEL'S PARLIAMENT:
THE LAW OF THE KNESSET 155-57 (1971); RUBINSTEIN, supra note 10, at 536; SAMUEL
SAGER, THE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF ISRAEL 195, 205 (1985); Yoram Dansiger, Towards
Reinforcing the Status of the Knesset's Decisions (pts. 1 & 2), 34 HAPRAKLIT 212, 233-34,
413, 424 (1982) (source in Hebrew).
130. Klein, supra note 31, at 273 n.6.
131. See Basic Law: The Government, § 3, 1968, 22 L.S.I. 257, 257 (1967-1968) ("The
Government holds office by virtue of the confidence of the Knesset.").
132. See Klein, supra note 31, at 276.
19961
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
ignation illustrate the problem of democratic legitimacy. In a no-
confidence vote, the Knesset withdraws its approval from the govern-
ment. The Knesset acts affirmatively to halt the present government
from continuing its policies, indeed from continuing in office. This
situation presents a legitimacy crisis for the current government, which
is not resolved until a new government that has the Knesset's confi-
dence is selected.
With resignation, the government acts affirmatively, stating that it
no longer has the ability or the desire to govern. There may be sev-
eral motivations for the government's action. It may seek to dissolve
the Knesset, in order to facilitate early elections in which it hopes to
secure a continued or an improved mandate. Most often, the govern-
ment resigns to preempt a no-confidence vote. 133
Thus, when the government resigns, it withdraws its acceptance
of Knesset confidence. Conversely, when the government is defeated,
the Knesset withdraws its confidence in the government. In both in-
stances, the government lacks a basis for its continuation.
The death of the Prime Minister presents a different situation. In
this situation, there has been no withdrawal of the basis of the gov-
ernment's existence. Neither the Knesset nor the government has
taken any action. When this situation arose with Rabin's assassina-
tion, opposition leader Binyamin Netanyahu was correct in stating that
murder should not replace governments. Rhetoric aside, his statement
expresses the belief that the death of the Prime Minister should not be
a basis for governmental change: because the existing government
maintains legitimacy, it should continue to exist.
Under the present system, the Prime Minister was the leader of
the party that could form a government. He owed his position not to
the electorate or the Knesset, but to the party or the party electorate.
The position of Prime Minister was not a personal one. A constitu-
ency did not give a seal of approval to any particular personality. The
premiership differed from the presidency because the Knesset per-
sonally elected the President. The Prime Minister achieved his posi-
tion by virtue of his personal strength within the party and the party's
strength with the electorate.
When the Prime Minister dies in office, the resulting caretaker
government does not have the same problems of legitimacy as a gov-
133. See LIKHovsKI, supra note 129, at 132.
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ernment that is defeated or resigns. Because the source of the Prime
Minister's power is the Knesset, his death does not alter the govern-
ment's legitimacy. The government continues to serve as long as the
Knesset's confidence remains. Under a system of direct election of the
Prime Minister, the government is composed of appointees of the
popularly-elected Prime Minister. They derive their legitimacy from
the Prime Minister. In the event of succession to the Prime Minister,
the new Prime Minister inherits the deceased Prime Minister's ad-
ministration.
The new system of direct election of the Prime Minister mandates
a special election solely to fill the vacant premiership within sixty days
of the Prime Minister's death. 134 The prospect of such an election two
months after an assassination is alarming. The possibility of simulta-
neous Knesset and prime ministerial elections, if less than a year re-
mains in the Knesset's term, compounds problems.1 35 Logistically, it
would be difficult, and perhaps unconstitutional, to hold an election
within such a short time. 136 Additionally, an election immediately af-
ter a Prime Minister's death may be divisive. Ministers would focus
on campaigning instead of governing. After the Prime Minister's
death, especially by assassination, the pressing need is to continue the
government and to consolidate and unite the factions and the country,
rather than to further divide parties and the country through the elec-
toral process. A quick election would deepen wounds that have had no
time to even begin healing.
Two simple options are available to remedy the problem: 137 the
134. See Basic Law: The Government, § 10, 1992, S.H. 214, translated in Israel Supple-
ment, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 9, 11 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gis-
bert H. Flanz eds., Susan Hattis Rolef trans., Release 94-7, 1994).
135. See supra pp. 64-65.
136. Under existing law, it takes 92 days for new parties to register. See Sarah Honig,
Peres to Call Early Election on Sunday, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 9, 1996, at 1. Justice Minis-
ter David Liba'i stated that any election date that does not allow sufficient time for new parties
to register will result in a High Court ruling against the date. See id.
137. Other more radical options also exist. The law for direct election of the Prime Minis-
ter could be scrapped in its entirety, permitting return to the old system under the 1968 Basic
Law. Given the growing criticism of the 1992 Basic Law, this option is definitely a possibil-
ity. See supra note 127. More radically, the election system could be changed to produce
majority governments, which are the norm in the "first past the post" constituency systems of
Canada and Great Britain. See Gideon Allon & Tzvi Zehariah, Peres V'Netanyahu Tomchim
B 'Bchirot Aizoriot L 'machatzit Maichevrai Haknesset [Peres and Netanyahu Support Regional
Elections for Half of the Members of the Knesset], HA'ARETS, Jan. 23, 1996, at A6 (suggesting
that Israel at least partially adopt a constituency system).
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elections could be held within 120 days, rather than 60 days, of the
Prime Minister's death, or the existing government could serve out its
term under a successor Prime Minister. The second option is prefer-
able to the first because the first option creates more problems than it
solves. First, although a long interval between the Prime Minister's
death and the new Prime Minister's succession may be necessary and
preferable for special elections, it compounds the problem of legiti-
macy for the caretaker government. Second, if the Interim Prime
Minister is not a candidate in the special elections, the government
may be viewed as a "lame duck" government simply biding its time
until the "real" government replaces it. Finally, lengthening the pe-
riod for the elections creates a long period of time where nothing gets
done in government. For these reasons, it is preferable for a succes-
sor to serve out the deceased Prime Minister's term. This option
would promote unity, continuity, and certainty. This type of succes-
sion is most appropriate when the deceased Prime Minister's term is
almost complete. For example, because Prime Minister Rabin's as-
sassination occurred within one year of the scheduled elections, com-
pletion of the deceased Prime Minister's term would have been prefer-
able to elections within 60, or even 120, days. The strongest
argument for special elections arises when the Prime Minister dies at
the beginning of his term. Even in this situation, however, govern-
ment continuity and certainty outweigh the drawbacks of an unelected
Prime Minister completing the term.
One of the largest problems to date in Israeli politics has been un-
certainty; no.party has received a majority of seats in the Knesset. 138
Every government has had to seek coalition partners and barter over
government policies.139 Thus, no government has been secure against
its fall. Many governments have fallen before the expiration of their
term because members of the coalition have left the government. 140
The constant threat of the fall of the government has contributed to the
well-known ills of Israeli politics: majorities are subject to minority
demands for the sake of keeping the coalition intact; the public purse is
138. See Laurie Copans, Israeli Coalition Talks Hit a Wall, UPI, June 11, 1996, available
in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File.
139. See Edward Walsh, Labor Ahead in Israel on Election Eve, WASH. POST, July 23,
1984, at Al.
140. See Daphne Barak-Eres, From an Unwritten to a Written Constitution: The Israeli
Challenge in American Perspective, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 309, 321 (1995).
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used to purchase the fidelity of small parties; and individual Knesset
members may sell their votes for political benefits. 141 The 1992 Basic
Law arose in the wake of one exceptionally egregious episode known
as hatargil hamasriach in 1990.142
Direct election of the Prime Minister was intended to alleviate
some of these base characteristics of Israeli politics. The more often
elections are held, however, the greater the opportunity for the persis-
tence and revival of these political maladies. It is doubtful that any
law will be able to root them out of Israeli politics entirely, but in de-
ciding on the best response to the death of a Prime Minister, these
political realities must be considered, and everything possible must be
done to prevent their occurrence. Special elections are not the solu-
tion.
When the Prime Minister dies in office, the prior government
should continue in office without the interruption of a transition gov-
ernment or Interim Prime Minister. In practice, a deceased Prime
Minister's government does continue in office after the Prime Minis-
ter's death. For example, when Prime Minister Levi Eshkol died in
1969, Golda Meir formed a new government that mirrored Eshkol's
with Meir replacing Eshkol as Prime Minister. 143 Similarly, after
Prime Minister Rabin's death, the government appointed Shimon Peres
as Interim Prime Minister until the party confirmed him as its leader
and Prime Minister. In forming his new government, Prime Minister
Peres retained virtually the same cabinet as Rabin, with only a few mi-
nor changes that Peres' ascension to the vacant premiership primarily
dictated. 144 Thus, Peres inherited Rabin's government. In most par-
liamentary democracies, especially in Great Britain, Canada, and Aus-
tralia, and in some presidential systems, such as in the United States,
no change in the status of the government results from its leader's
death. Constitutional law should reflect this accepted international and
Israeli practice.
Although there were calls for early elections in Israel after Prime
Minister Rabin's death, Prime Minister Peres' continuation in office
141. See id.
142. See ALLON, supra note 44, at 62-86.
143. See GAD YA'ACOBI, THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL 173 (1982). For a roster of
Meir's government, see Y.H. No. 1515, at 1120 (Mar. 17, 1969).
144. In addition to the premiership, Peres assumed the portfolio of Defense Minister,
leaving vacant his previous position as Minister of Foreign Affairs. See supra note 41.
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without direct electoral approval was not viewed as illegitimate.
Rather, Israelis realized that calling early elections would have been an
opportunistic attempt to capitalize on the voters emotions after the
tragic assassination. 145
With direct election of the Prime Minister, the argument for es-
tablishing a caretaker government with limited powers upon the Prime
Minister's death becomes stronger. The Prime Minister owes his po-
sition to direct election by the electorate, which is clearly personal,
though party affiliation obviously also plays a strong role. Similar to
the government's resignation or a no-confidence vote, the Prime Min-
ister's death withdraws the basis for the legitimacy of the existing gov-
ernment. The ministers appointed by the Prime Minister are indirect
delegates of the electorate that selected the Prime Minister to lead the
government.
It is unsettling for a government to hold a mid-term election to
replace a deceased leader. Even countries with direct election of the
head of government provide mechanisms to avoid such a scenario.
The most obvious example is the United States, where the office of the
Vice President is designed primarily for the sole purpose of succes-
sion. Elected together with the President, the Vice President has the
stamp of approval of the President and of the electorate. He may
serve out a deceased President's term without problems of legitimacy.
VI. PRESCRIPTION FOR REFORM: AUTOMATIC AND PERMANENT
SUCCESSION
Automatic and permanent succession promotes the values of gov-
ernment continuity, national unity, and quality and legitimate leader-
ship. Upon the Prime Minister's death, the nation needs a speedy and
certain succession to ensure government continuity. The present
situation in Israel is untenable because it requires the government to
undertake numerous procedures in order to replace the Prime Minis-
ter, creating the real possibility that the country may be leaderless for
a short time. Any leadership vacuum, even one lasting only a very
short time, is not acceptable in a country like Israel, which faces life
and death issues of war and terrorism on a daily basis. Other parlia-
mentary democracies like Canada and Great Britain may have the lux-
145. Several months later, however, Prime Minister Peres did call for early elections. See
Schmemann, supra note 127.
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ury of taking a few days or even weeks to replace a deceased leader,
but Israel does not yet enjoy this position. Succession in Israel must
therefore be automatic. It must also be permanent to permit govern-
ment continuity. The reality of Israeli practice has been that the
newly-formed government is the deceased Prime Minister's govern-
ment.
Automatic and permanent succession also furthers national unity,
which is imperative in times of crisis, such as the Prime Minister's
death. It prevents divisive and detrimental political struggles within
the governing party as the party selects a replacement leader, as well
as between parties in a full-fledged election campaign.
While succession should be automatic and permanent, it should
also produce a qualified leader. To accomplish this goal, one of the
ministers should be designated as the potential replacement for a de-
ceased Prime Minister. The history of the offices associated with the
nomenclature of both the Vice Premier (memaleh mekom) and the
Deputy Prime Minister (s'gan rosh ha'memshalah) is unfortunate be-
cause of their blatant political rather than functional nature. Retention
of the title of Vice Premier, however, is preferable because of its as-
sociation with the National Unity Government, where the Vice Premier
was the true stand-in for the Prime Minister and was the Pre-
mier-in-waiting, as well as being the Foreign Minister. As form does
affect content, Israel should avoid all nexus to the tarnished deputy
premiership.
If Israel adopted the model of the British Labour Party, the dep-
uty leader of the party would be the Vice Premier. Although Israeli
parties do not have official deputy leaders, a declaration that the
"number two" person on the Knesset list of the Prime Minister's party
would automatically become the Vice Premier would accomplish the
functional equivalent. This declaration would be an additional privilege
to the senior ministry that the "number two" person would receive in
the Prime Minister's government. Recent pre-election deals among
parties have demonstrated that party lists may be manipulated. Thus,
the Vice Premier must be a member of the Prime Minister's party.
This option would be preferable to other possibilities. Two of the
four 1990 bills for direct election of the Prime Minister would have
created a Deputy Prime Minister to run on the same ticket as the Prime
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Minister. 146 There is no need to further "Americanize" the Israeli
political system by transplanting the weakest executive office across
the Atlantic. The Vice Premier should not be a separate office doing
nothing but awaiting a prime ministerial vacancy.
Furthermore, the Prime Minister should not directly appoint the
Vice Premier. This option is tempting due to direct election of the
Prime Minister and the Prime Minister's power to appoint the other
ministers. If the Prime Minister has the power of appointment, how-
ever, it could become a bargaining chip in coalition politics. The port-
folio could be given to a minor coalition partner or could become an
empty ministry like the Ministry of Economics. If a minor coalition
partner holds the vice premiership upon the Prime Minister's death, an
intolerable situation would exist: the Prime Minister would not be di-
rectly elected, would lack connection to the party of the popu-
larly-elected Prime Minister, and would lack popular legislative sup-
port. 147 The greater the discretion in appointing the Vice Premier, the
greater the opportunity for political trickery and the danger of an un-
qualified candidate accidentally becoming Prime Minister. The reali-
ties of Israeli politics demonstrate that automatic selection is superior
to discretionary appointment.
Automatic appointment of the "number two" man on the party list
as the Vice Premier has virtues and vices. On the one hand, the sec-
ond person on the party list may be the acknowledged "number two"
man after the Prime Minister, but the Prime Minister's death may
change the equation. In voting for party candidates, the party elector-
ate does not vote for the Vice Premier. This is the outcome of the vote
under the proposed reform. On the other hand, the Vice Premier
would be linked to the party and the Prime Minister. Succession
would be predictable. The nation would know that the "number two"
man was qualified to succeed the Prime Minister upon the Prime Min-
146. See Amendment No. 5 to Basic Law: The Government, § 3(b), 1985, H.H. 154
(proposed by David Libai); Basic Law: The Government, § 10, 1985, H.H. 164 (proposed by
Yoash Tsiddon). In the third bill, the Prime Minister elect would submit his candidate for
Deputy Prime Minister to the Knesset for approval prior to the establishment of a new gov-
ernment. See Amendment No. 6 to Basic Law: The Government, 1985, H.H. 157 (proposed
by Uriel Lin). In the fourth bill, the Prime Minister would choose one of the Ministers to be
the Vice Premier or memaleh makom. See Basic Law: The Executive Authority, § 3, 1985,
H.H. 159 (proposed by Amnon Rubinstein). None of these options made it into the final ver-
sion of the 1992 Basic Law.
147. See WINTERTON, supra note 98, at 89-90 (discussing the problems of succession in
coalition governments).
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ister's death. The position at the top of the party list reflects party
strength and guarantees a senior ministry in the government. The Vice
Premier would certainly be a quality leader capable of leading the na-
tion.
VII. CONCLUSION
Prime Minister Rabin's death revealed the problem of succession
in Israeli politics. Israelis would have been in the throngs of stark
political strife at a time when national unity and leadership were im-
perative had there not been a unique combination of factors unlikely to
be repeated. Neither the old 1968 Basic Law nor the new 1992 Basic
Law adequately ensure orderly succession. In proposing reforms, at-
tempts to solve problems invariably create new ones. No system is
perfect. The suggested reforms for automatic and permanent succes-
sion would ensure that there is no power vacuum and that the succes-
sor is a qualified leader with electoral support: Above all else, auto-
matic and permanent succession of the Vice Premier would prevent
divisive political battles that could tear the government and the country
apart when it most needs unity. When death comes to the nation, the
country should be prepared and stand together.
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